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In its simplest terms, this appeal is about whether an oral express waiver is sufficient 
to waive the parties’ agreement that waiver can only occur in writing.  Here, the parties 
specifically agreed waiver of a contractual right can only occur if in writing by an 
authorized officer of the Company (the “Unwritten-Waiver” clause).  However, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees (“Plaintiffs”)1 nonetheless seek to pursue claims that on their face 
require the conclusion that Defendant/Appellant LifeVantage (“LifeVantage”) waived the 
Unwritten-Waiver clause by an alleged oral waiver.    
The relevant underlying facts are relatively simple.  After Plaintiff Bradley Dixon 
obtained ownership in more than one distributorship in violation of the parties’ agreement, 
LifeVantage exercised its right to terminate.  Plaintiffs sued, including for breach of contract 
and declaratory relief, based on a theory that LifeVantage waived its right to terminate 
should a distributor own more than one distributorship.  They alleged waiver based on an 
oral communication.  LifeVantage moved to dismiss arguing the contract specifies that 
waiver can only occur in a writing by an authorized officer.  The trial court denied 
LifeVantage’s motion based on its interpretation of two opinions of this Court:  Calhoun v. 
Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284 (Utah 1944), and Mounteer Enters., Inc. v. 
Homeowners Ass’n for Colony at White Pine Canyon, 2018 UT 25, 422 P.3d 809.  The trial 
court found that Utah law permits an express oral waiver of an Unwritten-Waiver Clause.  
This Court granted LifeVantage’s Petition For Permission to Appeal From Interlocutory 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs are Bradley Dixon and an entity, Al-In Partners, LLC, that held the terminated 




This Court’s decision in Mounteer makes clear that Utah law recognizes the parties’ 
freedom to determine what conduct will amount to waiver of rights under the parties’ 
agreement.  2018 UT 23, ¶ 19, 422 P.3d 809, 813.  Mounteer states “if the specific language 
of the antiwaiver clause expressly precludes parties from construing certain conduct as a 
waiver of contractual rights, courts must enforce this provision as part of the parties’ 
agreement.”  2018 UT 23, ¶ 19.  The trial court found that this Court intended Mounteer to 
only apply to cases of implied waiver, and that Calhoun still stands for the proposition that 
the parties cannot by contract agree on how express waiver can occur.  
This Court should clarify that Mounteer applies to both express and implied waivers, 
reverse the trial court’s denial of LifeVantage’s motion to dismiss, and remand to the trial 
court with instructions to grant LifeVantage’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of 
contract and declaratory relief claims.   
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issues:   
(1) Whether this Court’s decision in Mounteer Enters., Inc. v. Homeowners Ass’n 
for Colony at White Pine Canyon, 2018 UT 25, 422 P.3d 809, affected or 
altered the standard set forth in Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 
284 (Utah 1944), or whether Calhoun otherwise should be reconsidered. 
(2) Whether courts must enforce a provision of a parties’ agreement that 
precludes construing express conduct as a waiver of contractual rights. 
Standard of Review:  Interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law, 
 
8 
which is reviewed for correctness.  Utah Dept. of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC, 2012 UT 
79, ¶ 9, 304 P.3d 810, 813.   
Preservation:  This issue was preserved through (a) Defendant’s March 29, 2018 
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint and the Reply thereto; (b) Defendant’s oral 
argument at the May 30, 2019 hearing; and (c) the trial court’s Interlocutory Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Facts  
 LifeVantage manufactures wellness products and markets and sells its products to 
consumers through a network of independent distributors.  (R.00221.)  Each independent 
distributor enters into a contractual relationship with LifeVantage by signing the 
LifeVantage Distributor Application and Agreement, which incorporates the LifeVantage 
Distributor Policies & Procedures (“P&Ps”).  (R.00228, 00230, 00278, 00308.)  In 2009, the 
parties entered into such an agreement that included express provisions governing the 
ownership of multiple distributorships, when LifeVantage is permitted to terminate a 
distributorship, and when waiver of LifeVantage’s rights may occur.  (R.00226, 00230, 
00279, 00309.)2  
In Section 2.6 of the P&Ps, the parties expressly agreed LifeVantage “never gives up 
its right to insist on compliance with the Agreement” (the “Antiwaiver” provision) and 
waiver of a contractual right can only occur in writing by an authorized officer of 
                                                 
2 Section 4.4 of the P&Ps prohibits a distributor from owning more than one LifeVantage 
distributorship.  (R.00228, 00281, 00311.)  Section 14 of the P&Ps permits LifeVantage 
to terminate a distributorship when a distributor has breached a provision of the P&Ps.  
(R.00226, 00297–98, 00332–33.) 
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LifeVantage (the “Unwritten-Waiver” clause).  (R.00279, 00309.)  The Antiwaiver 
provision provides:  
The Company never gives up its right to insist on compliance with the 
Agreement . . . .  No failure of LifeVantage to exercise any right of power 
under the Agreement or to insist upon strict compliance by an Independent 
Distributor with any obligation or provision of the Agreement, and no custom 
or practice of the parties at variance with the terms of the Agreement, shall 
constitute a waiver of LifeVantage’s right to demand exact compliance with 
the Agreement. . . .  LifeVantage’s waiver of any particular breach by an 
Independent Distributor shall not affect or impair LifeVantage’s rights with 
respect to any subsequent breach . . . .  Nor shall any delay or omission by 
LifeVantage to exercise any right arising from a breach affect or impair 
LifeVantage’s rights as to that or any subsequent breach. . . .   
 
(R.00279, 00309.)  The Unwritten-Waiver clause states:  
Waiver by LifeVantage can be affected only in writing by an authorized 
officer of the Company.  
 
(R.00279, 00309.)  
After agreeing to the terms of the P&Ps, Dixon obtained ownership in more than one 
distributorship—Distributorships 101982 and 101987—contrary to his obligations under 
Section 4.4 of the P&Ps.  (R.00221–22, 00223–25.)  In correspondence dated November 11, 
2016, LifeVantage terminated Distributorship 101987, referencing Section 4.4 of the P&Ps, 
which prohibits a distributor from owning more than one LifeVantage distributorship.  
(R.00229.)  Plaintiffs allege LifeVantage waived Section 4.4 of the P&Ps based on an oral 
communication.  (R.00230–31.)   
2. Procedural History and District Court Disposition 
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on February 20, 2018, bringing claims 
for declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
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and promissory estoppel.  (R.00219–35.)  Plaintiffs alleged LifeVantage waived its right to 
enforce Section 4.4 of the P&Ps—the restriction on ownership of more than one 
distributorship. (R.00230–31.)  On March 29, 2019, LifeVantage filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the First Amended Complaint (“Motion”),3 arguing Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient 
to support waiver because, pursuant to Section 2.6 of the P&Ps, they expressly agreed that 
LifeVantage “never gives up its right to insist on compliance with the Agreement,” and, 
more importantly, that waiver of a contractual right can only occur if in writing by an 
authorized officer of LifeVantage.  (R.00256–344.)  
After the Motion was fully briefed but before oral argument, the Utah Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in Mounteer.  LifeVantage filed a Notice of Supplemental 
Authority to bring Mounteer to the trial court’s attention.  (R.00431–41.)  Ruling from the 
bench at the conclusion of the March 30, 2019 hearing, the trial court limited Mounteer to 
cases involving implied waiver, and found that this Court’s decision in Calhoun required the 
trial court to not enforce the parties’ Unwritten-Waiver clause.  (R.00538–41.)  The Motion 
was denied as to the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims on this basis.  
(R.00538–41, 00459–60.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the heart of this appeal is the question of whether parties to an agreement are free 
                                                 
3 Granting LifeVantage’s Motion in part, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ breach of 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel claims on grounds 
unrelated to this appeal.  (R.00538–42, 00459–60.)  The only remaining claims—and 
those subject to this appeal—are Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and declaratory 
relief.   
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to agree when express waiver of a contractual provision can occur, or more specifically: in 
Utah is an unwritten-waiver provision enforceable?  It cannot be disputed that permitting 
oral waiver of a provision stating waiver must occur in writing is to deem it unenforceable 
and of no meaning or effect.  LifeVantage asks this Court to conclude that the jurisprudence 
underlying Mounteer, and the Mounteer ruling itself, recognize that, barring 
unconscionability or other equitable attack, courts must enforce contracting parties’ 
agreements as to what conduct constitutes waiver, even in the case of express waiver.    
ARGUMENT 
The Parties’ agreement makes clear that LifeVantage has the right to terminate 
Plaintiffs’ distributorship if two distributorships are owned.  (R.00226.)  The Agreement 
also includes two distinct waiver provisions:  (1) the Antiwaiver provision that indicates 
LifeVantage never waives its ability to enforce its rights under the agreement, and (2) the 
Unwritten-Waiver clause—stating that waiver by LifeVantage can only occur when in 
writing by an authorized officer of the Company.  (R.00279, 00309.)  On its face, the 
Amended Complaint does not state a claim for breach of contract or declaratory relief unless 
LifeVantage can be found to have waived all three of the provisions identified above. 
(R.00279, 00309.)4   
                                                 
4 As the underlying motion is brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it is important to note that to prevail LifeVantage must show that, challenging 
the adequacy of the Amended Complaint on its face, Plaintiffs have failed to properly state a 
claim on which relief can be granted.  See Archuleta v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 2009 UT 36, ¶ 5, 
238 P.3d 1044.  In considering such a motion, the court must accept the plaintiffs’ factual 
allegations to be true, but “need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor [. . .] legal 
conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts.” Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
L.C., 2010 UT 29, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d 999.  In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may 
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It is settled Utah law that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, 
that “[c]ourts do not lightly consider a contract provision waived,” and that the “otherwise-
breaching party [must] show that the other party intentionally waived its rights under the 
contract.”  Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶¶ 17–18.  A waiver can be express or implied from a 
party’s conduct, but it must be clearly and distinctly made.  Id.  
Importantly, the Mounteer decision makes clear that waiver of each provision of an 
agreement must be considered individually (here, the underlying provision prohibiting dual 
ownership, the Antiwaiver provision, and the Unwritten-Waiver clause), and that waiver of 
the underlying provision does not amount to waiver of the other two.  Id. at ¶ 21 (This 
heightened burden requires “a party asserting waiver in the face of an antiwaiver clause [to] 
establish ‘a clear intent to waive both the [antiwaiver] clause and the underlying contract 
provision.’  And this second waiver must meet the same standard as waiver of the 
underlying provision—there must be an intentional relinquishment of that right.”).  In other 
words, if a party takes action that would amount to waiver of the underlying provision (such 
as agreeing to ownership of two distributorships), the party asserting waiver must 
additionally and separately show that the waiving party intentionally waived the other 
                                                 
“consider documents that are referred to in the complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff’s 
claim, regardless of whether such documents were actually included with the complaint.”  
BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ¶ 6, 322 P.3d 1172, 1174 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, where a litigant references an agreement, the court is not required to 
accept Plaintiffs’ pleaded interpretation of the contract as correct but instead is permitted to 
look beyond the four corners of the Amended Complaint to examine the underlying contract 
and interpret the same.  Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 13, 104 P.3d 




provisions (the Antiwaiver and Unwritten-Waiver clauses) as well.   
Citing Williston on Contracts, this Court in Mounteer noted “[a]ntiwaiver provisions 
aim to give contracting parties flexibility in enforcing their rights under the contract—
enforcement that would often be to the detriment of the other party—without  ‘result[ing] in 
a complete and unintended loss of its contract rights if it later decides that strict performance 
is desirable.’”  Id. at ¶ 19 (citing 13 Williston on Contracts § 39:15 (4th ed. 2018).  “So if 
the specific language of the antiwaiver clause expressly precludes parties from construing 
certain conduct as a waiver of contractual rights, courts must enforce this provision as part 
of the parties’ agreement.”  Id.  Accordingly, waiver of the underlying provision alone is not 
sufficient to amount to a waiver of the Unwritten-Waiver clause “because the failure to 
insist on performance after breach is entirely consistent with the rights set out in the 
antiwaiver provision—rights of flexibility that often benefit the otherwise breaching party[,] 
. . . [a]nd a finding of waiver in such circumstances would thus render the antiwaiver 
provision meaningless.”  Id. at ¶ 24.5   
                                                 
5 Mounteer’s ruling is consistent with the constitutional right of freedom to contract, which 
is both a liberty and a property right protected by due process.  See Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States, 31 S.Ct. 502, 516, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); see also 16B Am. Jur. 2d 
Constitutional Law § 641 (same).  This Court has repeatedly affirmed that “[p]ersons 
dealing at arm’s length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention 
of the courts for the purpose of relieving one side or the other from the effects of a bad 
bargain.”  Commercial Real Estate Inv., L.C. v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc., 2012 UT 49, ¶ 38, 
285 P.3d 1193, 1202 (quoting Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1978)).  “It is 
not [the court’s] prerogative to step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties.” Id. 
(quoting Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712, 717 (1958).  “Instead, unless 
enforcement of [the contract] would be unconscionable, [courts] should recognize and 
honor the right of persons to contract freely and to make real and genuine mistakes when 
dealings are at arm’s length.”  Utah Transit Auth. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2015 UT 53, ¶ 
31, 355 P.3d 947, 956 (quoting Commercial Real Estate Inv., 2012 UT at ¶ 38).  
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On the plain terms of Mounteer, the trial court should have granted LifeVantage’s 
Motion to Dismiss because there was nothing before the court that could amount to an 
intentional waiver by LifeVantage of the Unwritten-Waiver clause.  (R.00219–35.)  
Importantly, there is no allegation of a writing by an authorized officer of the company 
indicating that LifeVantage intended to waive any of the agreement’s provisions.  
(R.00219–35.)   
Oral argument on LifeVantage’s motion focused on this Court’s recent decision in 
Mounteer, with the trial court’s interpretation relying on a singular citation to Calhoun 
(without parenthetical, reasoning or explanation) for the unremarkable proposition that 
“express waiver of a contractual right is sufficient to waive both [the underlying provision 
and the antiwaiver provision].”6  Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶ 23.  While Mounteer was silent 
on the issue, the trial court focused on the existence of an unwritten-waiver clause in 
Calhoun and how the Calhoun Court ignored it when finding express waiver.7  On this basis 
alone (after acknowledging that Mounteer does not mention the unwritten-waiver clause in 
                                                 
 
6 The Calhoun opinion involved a car loan. 146 P.2d 284, 285–86 (Utah 1944).  The 
borrower had notified the company that he expected to be inducted into the army and, in 
response, the company “told [him] that he might have some time” to sell the car and get 
his equity out of it.  Id.  Two weeks later, the company exercised its contractual right to 
repossess the car after the buyer failed to sell the car or make a timely payment.  Id.  The 
contract contained an antiwaiver provision which stated that acceptance of late payments 
“shall not constitute a waiver of any other subsequent breach or default or prevent seller 
from immediately pursuing any or all of its remedies.”  Id. at 286.  The Calhoun Court 
held that the loan company expressly waived both its right to strictly enforce the payment 
due dates and the antiwaiver provision by its statements.  Id. at 287.  
7 The Calhoun contract provided that “no waiver of or change in the terms of this contract 
shall be binding . . . unless evidenced by writing signed by the parties.”  However, the 
Calhoun court did not meaningfully address this clause.  
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Calhoun or its enforceability in the face of an express or implied waiver), the trial court 
concluded that the reasoning of Mounteer (including ¶¶ 17–22) has no application where 
waiver is express, and thus an unwritten-waiver clause does not preclude oral waiver, so 
long as it is express.  (R.00538–41.)  In its own words, the trial court explained: 
I don’t have any problem with the concept that Mounteer establishes a fairly 
high burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking to prove waiver of a provision and 
separately to prove waiver of the antiwaiver provisions; and for that matter, in 
this case, to prove waiver of the requirement that any waiver be made in 
writing by an officer.  That’s a high burden.  But Mounteer also appears to 
draw a distinction between sins of omission and sins of commission.  That is 
conduct where a breach is allowed to proceed versus affirmative conduct by a 
party - - a contracting party that affects its rights under the contract.  And it’s 
for that reason I look at the paragraph citing to Calhoun, where Mounteer 
leaves untouched the holding that an express waiver of one provision waives 
the antiwaiver provision, as well.  Doesn’t mention in Mounteer the effect on 
a requirement that a waiver be made in writing.  But it does cite with 
Calhoun.  And Calhoun actually did involve the provision that not only had 
an antiwaiver provision but also a requirement that waiver be made in writing 
by an officer.  And Calhoun ignored that.  
 
(R.00539–40.)  
However, a reading of Mounteer demonstrates its citation to Calhoun was simply 
intended to reaffirm the general law on express waivers in Utah, rather than to erase over 70 
intervening years of contractual jurisprudence on which the Utah Supreme Court based its 
ultimate holding in Mounteer.8  See Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶¶ 17–22.  Whether express or 
                                                 
8 Were Calhoun considered today in light of the decades of decisions on contractual law 
generally and waiver law specifically, a court would enforce the parties’ agreement as 
written, requiring not only evidence of an intentional relinquishment of the underlying 
provision, but also of both the anti-waiver provision and unwritten-waiver clause as this 
Court articulated in Mounteer.  Importantly, this Court’s decisions do not identify every 
previous opinion intended to be modified thereby.  Instead, Utah law is set by the most 
recent opinion of this Supreme Court and all prior opinions that materially differ are no 
longer controlling.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Auto. Emporium v. Murchison, 289 Or. 673, 
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implied, Mounteer makes clear that Utah law recognizes the freedom to contract, including 
to determine what conduct will amount to waiver of rights under the parties’ agreement.  Id. 
at ¶ 19.  Even if the Mounteer Court intended to leave the application of contractual law as 
to express waivers for another day, it is impossible to apply the same reasoning to the 
Unwritten-Waiver clause here and reach a different conclusion as doing so would render the 
clause meaningless, unenforceable and ignored, and the “complete and unintended loss of 
[one party’s] contract rights.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  
Thus, under the reasoning of Mounteer, even express oral waiver of the right to 
“insist on performance of an underlying provision [limiting a person to one distributorship] 
is insufficient to establish the intentional relinquishment of [LifeVantage’s] rights under the 
[Unwritten-Waiver clause].”  Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶ 24.  In other words, even assuming 
LifeVantage orally waived the underlying provision or even the Unwritten-Waiver clause 
itself, such an action is entirely consistent with the flexibility of rights set out in the 
agreement—that waiver shall only occur if in writing by an officer of the Company.  Id.  
Clearly, “a finding of waiver in such circumstances would thus render the [Unwritten-
Waiver clause] meaningless.” Id.; see also id. at ¶ 22 (quoting Van Bibber v. Norris, 275 
Ind. 555, 419 N.E.2d 115, 121 (1981) (“[a]llowing waiver where the party has not clearly 
waived the antiwaiver provision would undo [the agreement between the parties] and would 
‘beg[] the question of validity of the non-waiver clause.’”)); Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor 
                                                 
675, 616 P.2d 496, 497 (1980) (prior opinions superseded by more recent opinion); Acme 
Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N.Y. 495, 504, 109 N.E. 577, 579 (1915) (same); State v. 
Adams, 144 Ohio St. 3d 429, 472, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 265, 45 N.E.3d 127, 171 (same).  
To the extent Calhoun could be considered to contradict Mounteer, Mounteer controls.   
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Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 15, 210 P.3d 263 (This court “consider[s] each contract 
provision . . . with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted).).   
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and declaratory relief claims—
which rise and fall on whether LifeVantage waived the Unwritten-Waiver clause—fail as a 
matter of law.   
CONCLUSION 
This Court should now reverse the trial court’s denial of LifeVantage’s motion to 
dismiss and, on remand, direct the trial court to enforce the parties’ agreement as written, 
and grant LifeVantage’s motion to dismiss.   
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2020. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
 
 
/s/ Gregory M. Saylin     
Gregory M. Saylin 
Brittany J. Merrill 
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